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Unrest in Serendip: the Contraction of
the Motor Vehicle Inventory as an
Exception to the Mapp Rule
By R. CORBiN HOUCmNS*
POLICEMEN are frequently placed in unsolicited control of mo-
tor vehicles whose owners are absent or are being removed to jail or
hospital. The officer ordinarily does not know what is in the car, but,
it is said, fears that unless he makes a list of its contents the owner
may later claim something is missing-whether or not the article was
originally there. He therefore goes through everything in the vehicle,
including the contents of closed suitcases, and with predictable regu-
larity finds narcotics or, more rarely, evidence of a nonsumptuary
crime. Until the decision in Mozzetti v. Superior Court1 was handed
down on April 30, 1971, most lower courts in California would have
admitted as evidence whatever the officer might find, so long as he was
not looking for it.2
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the the-
ories used prior to Mozzetti to justify the police motor vehicle inventory
as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and to consider some of the
constitutional issues raised by the current status of the practice. Prob-
ably more inventory cases have been reported in California than in all
other jurisdictions combined. Moreover, California has in Mozzetti
given the field its leading case. The following discussion will, there-
fore, focus on the theory used to justify the inventory in the California
state courts, with reference to decisions of the United States Supreme
Court as required. Because the second largest source of inventory
cases, the lower federal courts, presents similar responses to the same
* A.B., 1962, Harvard College; LL.B., 1966, University of Virginia; Member,
California Bar; Associate Member, Virginia Bar.
@ R. Corbin Houchins and The Hastings Law Journal 1972.
1. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
2. E.g., People v. Marchese, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1007, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1969);
People v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 631, 80 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1969).
problems which are encountered in California, it seems defensible to
sacrifice it along with the other forty-nine states to the exigencies of
space.3
The bulk of the material to be covered has also occasioned some
abridgment of evaluative comment. In drawing conclusions, it is as-
sumed that the inventory is ultimately but one illustration of the colli-
sion between the service functions of the state and the desideratum of
individual privacy. Since discussion of the proper balance between
freedom and collective security, or even whether the Constitution pro-
tects privacy at all, is beyond the scope of the article, the procedure
adopted is the usual one of simply treating all such fundamental issues
as if they had been settled in accordance with the author's views.
Review of Constitutional Treatment of
Vehicle Searches
In order properly to assess the status of the inventory in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence it is necessary to consider the unique place
the automobile has occupied in the development of search and seizure
law and the extent of the constitutional protection it now enjoys.
The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause."4 The Supreme Court has held that:
Searches conducted without warrants [are] unlawful "notwith-
standing facts unquestionably showing probable cause" . . for the
Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of ajudicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the po-
lice. . . ." [S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ...
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.5
Two historically important exceptions to the warrant clause arose in
the law of search and seizure as applied to the automobile. Under the
3. There is no United States Supreme Court decision dealing with inventory is-
sues as clearly as Mozzetti, and the district and circuit courts remain inconsistent.
The trend, however, seems toward the Mozzetti rule. Compare Kimbrough v. Beto,
412 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1969) and Lockett v. United States, 390 F.2d 168 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877 (1968) with Williams v. United States, 412 F.2d 729 (5th
Cir. 1969) and Ramon v. Cupp, 423 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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first no warrant is needed to search a mobile car when there is probable
cause to believe it contains contraband. 6 The second exception (now
questionable) allowed search of an automobile if the search was inci-
dental to a valid arrest. 7
Carroll v. United States
Withdrawal of warrant clause protection of the automobile began
in Carroll v. United States.' In Carroll federal prohibition agents
stopped the defendant as he was traveling on the highway. The agents
commenced searching the automobile even though the defendant had
not yet been arrested, and found liquor which was used as evidence at
Carroll's trial for violation of the National Prohibition Act. The Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction, holding that probable cause to be-
lieve an automobile which is being operated on a highway contains con-
traband is sufficient to justify a warrantless search, where the circum-
stances indicate that the vehicle would be out of the jurisdiction by the
time a warrant could be obtained. Thus, police officers are entitled to
stop and search the fleeting target of a mobile vehicle upon their own
determination that it probably contains contraband- By extension, the
power is commonly thought to apply to noncontraband items of evi-
dentiary value as well.
The Rabinowitz and Chimel Cases
Prior to 1969, the leading authority for searches incidental to ar-
rest was United States v. Rabinowitz,'0 which put the extent of Fourth
Amendment protection upon an entirely subjective basis. Under Ra-
binowitz, which did not involve an automobile, the pivotal question
was not whether it would have been reasonable to procure a warrant,
but whether it appeared reasonable to the court for the police to have
proceeded without one. The incidental search rested ultimately not
upon probable cause to believe anything would be found, but upon
the concept that a search might be "reasonable" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment even if based on factors which would be insuf-
ficient for the issuance of a warrant. The effect on automobile cases
was to undermine the requirements, preserved in Carroll, that there be
probable cause to search and an urgent reason for dispensing with a
6. See text accompanying notes 8-9 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 10-12 infra.
8. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
9. Id. at 156 (dictum).
10. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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warrant, and to substitute in essence a requirement that what the police
did must have appeared to be reasonable to a rational man concerned
with effective law enforcement. It was during the Rabinowitz period
that cases on inventory began to appear.
In 1969, with Chimel v. California" Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence returned to the principle that the warrant is a norm from
which departures, to be legitimate, must be exigent. Repudiating Ra-
binowitz, the court adopted an analysis which should have eliminated
the subjective approach to search and seizure. In Chimel the police had
followed the then prevailing practice of ransacking a dwelling in which
an arrest had been made as a purported incident of the arrest. The
officers found incriminating evidence which was admitted into evidence
as the fruits of a search lower courts found reasonable because related
to an arrest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the broad
Rabinowtiz test was no longer acceptable. Hewing to the standard of
exigency, it ruled that there was no compelling reason to dispense with
a warrant in the case of the house, and stated that the proper area of a
search incident to an arrest encompasses only the arrestee's person
and the area "'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence."'" The opinion expressly left the
Carroll exception standing.
Preston v. United States
One of the important secondary effects of Chimel was revitaliza-
tion of Preston v. United States, 3 which had fallen into relative neglect.
There three men had been arrested for vagrancy. At the time of their
arrest they were sitting in a parked car which was later towed to a ga-
rage and searched by the police. The court held that the car, having
been deprived of mobility, fell outside the exception created by Carroll
and could be invaded only with prior judicial approval.
[S]ince the men were under arrest at the police station and the car
was in police custody at a garage, [there was no] danger that the
car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction.14
The Chimel opinion describes Preston with approval' 5 as resting
on the "same basic principle" as Sibron v. New York,' where an in-
11. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
12. Id. at 763.
13. 376 U.S. 364 (1964)
14. Id. at 368.
15. 395 U.S. at 763-64.
16. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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vestigatory intrusion into the pocket of a man seen talking to a series of
narcotics suspects was held unlawful. Both cases involve conduct
which was, in the lay sense, reasonable, and reference to them in Chimel
underscores the majority's determination to differentiate the technical
Fourth Amendment meaning of the term.
From Carroll and Preston after Chimel it is possible to extract
the rules that a car must be a fleeting target for search before the war-
rant clause is inapplicable, and a search without probable cause is lim-
ited to an arrestee's person and immediate surroundings at the time of
arrest.
Amendment of the Fourth Amendment
in Automobile Impound Cases
The foregoing rules seem clear and workable and preserve some
contact with comprehensible Fourth Amendment theory. Their appli-
cation to cases involving automobiles, however, has been confusing
at best, as a review of the cases will show.
Cooper v. California
In 1967, Preston was distinguished in Cooper v. California,17
which involved the noninventory search of a car impounded pursuant
to the California forfeiture provision for vehicles used to transport
narcotics. Cooper had sold heroin to a police informer. He was ar-
rested shortly thereafter, and the car he had used in his illicit activities
was searched and impounded in a commercial garage. The impound
was authorized by a statute, since repealed, which permitted the Divi-
sion of Narcotic Enforcement to hold the car "as evidence until a for-
feiture has been declared or a release ordered.1' 8  The statute made
forfeiture of the vehicle mandatory if, inter alia, the vehicle was shown
in a summary hearing to have been used to transport or facilitate the
keeping of illegal narcotics.
About a week after impounding the car, officers searched it a sec-
ond time and found a piece of paper similar to that which had been used
to wrap the heroin. Four months later, a third search produced a single
marijuana seed. Both the paper and the seed were introduced as evi-
dence in Cooper's trial for the illegal sale of heroin.
Agreeing with Cooper that the piece of brown paper and the
marijuana seed had been erroneously introduced, the California district
17. 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967).
18. Cal. Stats. 1939, ch. 60, § 11610, at 767.
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court of appeal nevertheless affirmed his conviction on the harmless er-
ror theory, holding that no miscarriage of justice had taken place.19
After Cooper's petition for a hearing in the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia was denied, he appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Under Fahy v. Connecticut,2 in which the Court the preced-
ing year had somewhat ambiguously restricted the application of the
harmless error rule, Cooper apparently had only to show "a reasonable
possibility that the [illegally seized evidence] might have contributed to
the conviction." 21
The high Court accepted Cooper's case. 22 In an opinion which
defies analysis in terms of Fourth Amendment interests, a majority of
five justices was "satisfied that the lower court erroneously decided that
our Preston case required that this search be held an unreasonable one
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. '23  Thus, in a single
stroke, the Court avoided clarifying Fahy and managed to render the
theretofore manageable Carroll-Preston dichotomy 24 unclear.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a majority of the Court, first dis-
tinguished Preston as involving a search whose legality depended en-
tirely upon the lawfulness of the arrest to which it was incident. To
determine the legality of such a search, he said, Preston's car, though in
the hands of the police, must be treated as if it were in the defendant's
custody.2 5 A negative inference from that reasoning is that Preston
does not apply once the police have acquired lawful custody of the
vehicle. It would seem to follow that the police have unrestricted ac-
cess to the contents of any car which can be taken into their possession
under an impound or removal law.
The expressed fears of the dissenters notwithstanding, 26 the ma-
jority refrained from equating lawful custody with license to search:
19. People v. Cooper, 234 Cal. App. 2d 587, 44 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1965), aff'd,
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
20. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
21. Id. at 86-87. In Fahy, the controlling question was not "whether there was
sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evi-
dence complained of . . . [but] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evi-
dence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id.
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), the Court apparently rede-
fined the test: "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
22. 384 U.S. 904 (1966).
23. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967).
24. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
25. 386 U.S. at 60.
26. "There are those who do not like Preston. I think, however, it states a
healthy rule, protecting the zone of privacy of the individual as prescribed by the
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While it is true, as the lower court said, that "lawful custody of an
automobile does not of itself dispense with constitutional require-
ments of searches thereafter made of it" . . . the reason for and
nature of the custody may constitutionally justify the search.27
The opinion emphasized that the seizure of the car was mandatory un-
der the California impound statute:
[T]he officers seized petitioner's car because they were required
to do so by state law. They seized it because of the crime for
which they arrested petitioner. They seized it to impound it and
they had to keep it until forfeiture proceedings were concluded.28
Addressing himself to the question of the legality of the subsequent
search, Mr. Justice Black concluded:
[The] subsequent search of the car. . . was closely related to the
reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been im-
pounded, and the reason it was being retained. The forfeiture of
petitioner's car did not take place until over four months after it
was lawfully seized. It would be unreasonable to hold that the po-
lice, having to retain the car in their custody for such a length of
time, had no right. . . to search it.29
The authority cited is Rabinowitz.3"
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.
In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.81 the Court ap-
parently limited the year-old Cooper decision to impounded, rather than
merely towed, vehicles. In Dyke the defendant was arrested after
speeding to elude a pursuing police car. Officers drove the arrestee's
car to the county jail and searched it. The Court, citing Preston, re-
versed the defendant's conviction, which was based upon evidence dis-
covered by the search. Distinguishing Cooper, Justice White said that
the Court in that case had "upheld a warrantless search of a car im-
pounded 'as evidence' pursuant to a state statute."3  "In the instant
case," he noted,
there is no indication that the police had purported to impound or
to hold the car, that they were authorized by any state law to do so,
or that their search of the car was intended to implement the pur-
Fourth Amendment. These days police often take possession of cars, towing them
away when improperly parked. Those cars are 'validly' held by the police. Yet if
they can be searched without a warrant, the precincts of the individual are invaded and
the barriers to privacy breached." Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 61-62.
30. Id. at 62, citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
31. 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
32. Id. at 220-21.
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poses of such custody. Here the police seem to have parked the car
near the courthouse merely as a convenience to the owner, and to
have been willing for some friend or relative of [the owner] to
drive it away.88
Harris v. United States and the No-Search Theory
An important issue left unanswered in Cooper is whether an offi-
cer may conduct a warrantless search pursuant to a state statute au-
thorizing the police to take custody of a vehicle otherwise than as part
of a forfeiture proceeding. In Dyke the Court was not compelled to
confront the question. In Harris v. United States34 the court managed
to avoid the question by holding that the police conduct did not consti-
tute a search.
Harris involved evidence found in a car pursuant to a District of
Columbia regulation which expressly authorized a warrantless search
of the vehicle without probable cause. Harris had been arrested for
robbery while getting into his parked car, which was seized and towed
to the police station. According to the police regulation, the officer
who had taken the car into custody was required "to search the vehicle
thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it, and to attach to the vehicle
a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of the
impounding." 5  Pursuant to the regulation, the arresting officer
searched the defendant's car after its arrival at the police parking lot.
Upon completion of the search, the officer walked around the vehicle
to roll up the passenger-side window and to lock the door-measures
taken, the Court felt, simply to protect the car's contents from the rain
and from possible theft. Upon opening the front door on the passen
ger's side, the officer saw an automobile registration card belonging to
the robbery victim lying face up on the door sill. The admissibility
of the card, and not of any fruits of the officer's inventory, was in issue
on Harris's appeal.
Avoiding consideration of the validity of the regulation, the Court
adopted as a finding of fact what appears to have been an important le-
gal conclusion of the intermediate appellate court:
The sole question for our consideration is whether the of-
ficer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal search.
We hold that he did not. The admissibility of evidence found as
a result of [the] search under the police regulation is not presented
33. Id. at 221.
34. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 235. The language is from the opinion, which does not reveal whether
the procedure was referred to as a "search" in the regulation.
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by this case. The precise and detailed findings of the District
Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals, were to the effect that
the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car,
but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police
custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police
to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances.
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card,
with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible. It
has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.36
The Harris opinion appears to assume that the initial inventory
was a search and that, had any evidence been discovered, it would have
been inadmissible. Mr. Justice Douglas was moved to make his views
on the question somewhat more explicit. In a concurring opinion he
explained that he joined the majority on the grounds that the police
discovered the evidence "while engaged in the performance of their
duty to protect the car, and not engaged in an inventory or other search
of the car. .... ,,. 7
The Automobile in Current Fourth Amendment
Theory-Chambers v. Maroney
Putting the cases together is somewhat frustrating. Taken to-
gether, Cooper, Dyke and Harris suggest that the police, upon taking
a car into custody pursuant to a statute, may have a right of search "to
implement the purposes of such custody, 3 8 while Preston and Chimel
indicate that a warrantless station house search of an immobilized au-
tomobile after the arrest of its occupants would violate the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court took a different position, however,
in Chambers v. Maroney. 9
In Chambers, police officers arrested the occupants of a station
wagon on probable cause to believe that they had just committed a rob-
bery in the area. The officers took their car, drove it to the police sta-
tion and searched it without a warrant. Although the arrest was lawful,
the Court, citing Preston and Dyke, conceded the search was not inci-
dent to that arrest.40 There was, however, probable cause to believe
36. Id. at 236. The majority opinion omitted reference to Preston, prompting
Mr. Justice Douglas to write in a concurring opinion: "Though Preston . . . is not
mentioned in the Court's opinion, I assume it has survived. . . ." Id. at 236-37.
37. Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
38. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968).
39. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
40. Id. at 47.
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that guns and stolen money were in the car. As the Court saw it, the
pivotal issue was whether the warrant requirement was excused under
Carroll."' Therefore, in order to appreciate the problems created by
Chambers, it is necessary first to consider an important question left
unanswered by Carroll and Preston.
The essence of the Carroll decision is the finding that the car was
a "fleeting target for search. '4 2 The object of the search in that case
was contraband, which the officers had a right to seize whether or not
they arrested the occupants of the car. The opinion centers on the rea-
sonable cause to believe that the liquor was in the vehicle, rather than
on the propriety of arresting the persons who were transporting it. With
hindsight from Preston and Dyke, it appears that the Court must have
assumed someone (other than the police) was available to drive the
car away while the officers went for a warrant.
The Preston case is commonly regarded as presenting the opposite
side of the Carroll coin when it declares that "the reasons that have
been thought sufficient to justify warrantless searches carried out in
connection with an arrest no longer obtain when the accused is safely
in custody at the station house. ' 43  That formulation, however, falls
short of laying down a workable rule for determining whether the car
remains mobile. The reason Preston does not adequately set limits to
Carroll after Chimel is that the opinion is primarily concerned with
remoteness rather than mobility. At the time Preston was handed down
it was permissible to search the car as an incident of arresting its driver,
provided the search was not too remote in time and space from the ar-
rest. After Chimel the question of remoteness has little importance for
vehicle searches, since the ease of taking a suspect from his car at the
time of arrest renders the scope of a search for weapons or destructible
evidence within his reach in the car quite small, perhaps practically co-
extensive with the "plain sight" rule.4 4 The significance of the removal
of the driver therefore now lies entirely in its effect on the continued
mobility of the car.45
41. Id. at 47-48.
42. Id. 48-52.
43. Id. at 47.
44. Contra, United States v. Brooks, 310 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Ark. 1970), a hot
pursuit case where the court evidently was of the opinion that the officers, having cap-
tured and subdued the defendant with great travail, deserved a cooling off period before
becoming subject to the strictures of Chimel.
45. There are, of course, some cases in which the mobility of the car is prob-
lematic even with no driver in sight. In People v. Drake, 243 Cal. App. 2d 560,
52 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1966), officers found an illegally parked car which did not display
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At this point the general law of search and seizure shares an im-
portant concern of inventory law, for the issue of mobility is governed
to a large extent by police impound practices. In theory an arrestee's
car remains subject to the owner's right of possession by agent.46 Evi-
dence which the police have probable cause to believe is within the car
might thus be released along with the vehicle during a delay to procure
a warrant. In practice, however, there is little likelihood that the po-
lice would leave a car suspected of containing evidence in a commercial
garage to be picked up by the owner or his representative. One may
safely assume that officers will either search immediately or seize the
entire car and require a court order to release it, so long as an investiga-
tion is pending.47 The real question may be, therefore, whether it is
preferable in view of Fourth Amendment interests to justify current
practice by extending Carroll or by creating a new type of investiga-
tory detention, authorizing police actually to impound a car to which
probable cause to search attaches, while a warrant is being obtained.
It seems apparent that protection of reasonable expectations as to
the privacy of one's effects is better served by a short de facto police
impound than by prompt warrantless search.48  Nevertheless, in Cham-
a registration slip, as required by California Vehicle Code section 4484. A cursory
inspection turned up the registration card, which bore an address for the owner some
two miles distant. At that point the officers had cause "[t]o reasonably suspect that
the vehicle might have been stolen and hurriedly abandoned on a public highway."
243 Cal. App. 2d at 564, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 591. The question raised was, given the
reasonableness of that suspicion, what further invasion of the vehicle was permissible.
The court of appeal upheld reaching under the dashboard in search of a "hotwire."
As it turned out, the apparent privacy of the recess into which the police intruded had
been relied upon by the owner to stash a small quantity of marijuana, on which the
conviction appealed from was based. Since the officers in Drake did not know
whether a car thief lurked nearby, ready to resume his asportation upon their leaving
for the magistrate's office, they might be thought to come within Carroll if there was
probable cause to believe that instrumentalities of car theft were under the dashboard.
On the other hand, the ease of leaving one officer to watch the car while the other
visited the nearby residence of the owner suggests that it was not necessary to violate
the "zone of privacy" even to that limited extent, in order to carry out police objec-
tives. The Drake opinion leaves one wondering whether the Carroll doctrine is not
being misapplied when courts authorize warrantless searches to which there are prac-
ticable investigatory alternatives.
46. See Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 127, 132-33, 73 Cal. Rptr.
793, 796-97 (1968), where the court held arrest of a driver may justify removal of his
vehicle from the highway but does not necessarily justify custodial possession of the car.
47. The demands of the police mission sometimes lead to courses of action
which are difficult to place analytically. Officers in Tygart v. State, 248 Ark. 125,
451 S.W.2d 225, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction and cert. denied, 400 U.S.
807 (1970), made a Carroll search, then seized the car and procured a warrant to
search again.
48. An owner to whom privacy is of lesser importance than possession of the
February 1972]
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bers the Supreme Court of the United States declared:
Carroll ...holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway;
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's con-
tents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judg-
ment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted un-
til a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" in-
trusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater."
But which is the "greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion is it-
self a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety
of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no differ-
ence between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.
Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment. 49
It would be difficult to extract a neutral principle from a ju-
dicial determination that the officers had the right to seize the vehicle
for their convenience in searching, because they could seize it for the
purpose of seeking a search warrant. The syllogism that because there
is "little to choose" between the seizure to search and the seizure to im-
mobilize proposed by the petitioner, then "either course is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment"5" is self-cancelling, since the exception
to Preston depends upon mobility having been retained at the station
house. If the officers could indeed have held the car to get a warrant, 51
the Court's reliance on Carroll is at best confusing.
There is little doubt that Chambers qualifies Chimel and thus in-
troduces new uncertainties into the application of Preston. After Pres-
ton had been reaffirmed in Chimel, it exercised an immediate effect on
searches of automobiles in police custody. In Colosimo v. Perini52 the
district court had relied on Rabinowitz in denying habeas corpus. Pe-
titioner had been seen under circumstances "which made it quite clear
that he and another were engaged in the business of stealing from cars"
parked in view of an airport control tower.53  Both the district court
car can always consent to the search and end the impound, assuming the vehicle has
not itself been seized as evidence.
49. 399 U.S. at 51-52.
50. Id.
51. The Chambers opinion concerns only what is constitutionally permitted and
does not advert to Pennsylvania law on towing and impound.
52. 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969) (reversing the district court), vacated & re-
manded per curiam, 399 U.S. 519 (1970), original dist. ct. opinion aff'd on remand,
432 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 805.
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and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the police offi-
cers to whom the conduct was reported "had sufficient probable cause
to arrest the petitioner and his associate." 54 Upon their arrest, the car
they had been using to visit the parking lot was placed in the custody
of a police officer on the scene. A short time later officers found a
trunk key in the back seat of the police car which had transported the
suspects to jail. They returned to the airport parking lot, opened the
trunk of the defendants' car with the key and seized certain articles
which were used as evidence in Colosimo's state trial.55 The court of
appeals found the entry illegal and granted the writ, based on the "il-
lumination" of Preston provided by Chimel.56
After the Chambers decision, however, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment.57  The Supreme
Court then remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit "for further consid-
eration in light of Chambers v. Maroney . . ,,"l On remand, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the original district court opinion. 59
Summary
Although the cases do not lend themselves to a consistent theory,
it may be useful to conclude this section with an outline of some of
the principles which can be adduced thus far: (1) If the police arrest
the occupants of a car, they may not search the entire vehicle merely as
an incident of a lawful arrest. 60 (2) If the police have probable cause
to believe that a car contains contraband or evidence of a crime, they
may stop it and, so long as it is not deprived of its mobility, search it
on the spot without a warrant.6 ' (3) If in situation number two it is
unsafe or highly inconvenient to search the car on the spot, the police
may seize it and take it to the station house, where they may search im-
mediately without a warrant.62 (4) If, however, in situation number
two the car owner is in jail and there is no probable cause to suspect
the existence of contraband, the police may not conduct a warrantless
search at their leisure.6 3 (5) If the police are required by statute to
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 805-06.
57. Perini v. Colosimo, 399 U.S. 519 (1970) (per curiam).
58. Id.
59. 432 F.2d 1357 (1970) (per curiam).
60. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
61. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
62. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
63. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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keep the vehicle for an extended period of time while it is being forfeited
to the state, they may search without a warrant or probable cause "for
their own protection. '6 4
The Automobile in California
In the past fifteen years, the California courts have shaped the
contours of the law regarding vehicle inventory. Before Mozzetti most
courts proceeded from the assumption that the police, upon removing a
vehicle from the highway or impounding it, had the right to inventory
the contents of the vehicle.6 5 There was, however, no agreement on
the theory which justified inventories. Three major theories did evolve,
but the cases often made no clear distinction as to which theory was
being applied since the majority of the pre-Mozzetti inventory cases
were based on alternative holdings which adopted two of the three ma-
jor theories-but in various combinations."; Adding to the confusion
was a group of cases which dispensed with theoretical justification alto-
gether.6 7
To appreciate the problems that Mozzetti solved and to under-
stand what types of vehicle searches in California are still permissible
one must examine the theoretical justifications for inventories which
may be called no-seizure, no-search and no-objection. The no-seizure
theory holds that evidence found during an inventory was already in
the legal possession of the police because they had legal possession of
the automobile, and, therefore, no seizure of evidence occurred. The
no-search theory disperses Fourth Amendment questions through se-
mantics, holding that an inventory is not a search but only what it pur-
ports to be-an inventory. The no-objection theory claims that the in-
ventory is justified as a reasonable search because it is designed to fur-
ther the ends of protecting the police and garageman from fraudulent
claims and protecting the owner by minimizing the risk that his prop-
64. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967) (dictum).
65. E.g., People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (discussed
in text accompanying notes 89-90 infra). Contra, Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 Cal.
App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968) (discussed in text accompanying notes 76-78
infra).
66. E.g., People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968) (dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 102-04 infra); People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d
248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (discussed in text accompanying notes 89-90 & 100-01 infra);
People v. Norris, 262 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 897, 68 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1968) (discussed in
text accompanying notes 106-07 infra).
67. E.g., People v. Marchese, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1007, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1969);
People v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 631, 80 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1969).
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erty will be lost or stolen, goals to which no reasonable person could ob-
ject.
Some preliminary consideration of terminology must precede de-
tailed discussion of inventory cases, since many of the appellate opin-
ions which follow refer to the inventory as incidental to impounding a
vehicle when in fact no impound has taken place. Understanding the
distinction between mandatory impound and other custody is also of
great importance in assessing the effect of Cooper v. California.
California Impound Statutes
Since 1967 there has been neither a California statute providing
for the forfeiture of an automobile because of its use in transporting nar-
cotics nor any other law making police impound mandatory."" The
power to impound now exists only under the circumstances described in
three California statutes. The first, adopted in 1949, permits a court to
order the impounding of a car owned and used by a person convicted
for driving while his driver's license has been suspended or revoked. 9
The impound may be accomplished "in such manner as the court may
determine. ' 70 The second type of impound, added by statute in 1959,
does not require a court order. A policeman may take a car into cus-
tody if he has reasonable cause to believe that it has been involved in a
hit-and-run accident in which the driver failed to perform the duty to
divulge his identity, as required by California Vehicle Code sections
20002 through 22006. The vehicle may be withheld from the owner
for up to 24 hours, after which time it must be returned upon request.
There is no inventory provision, and the 24-hour period would seem
adequate for obtaining a warrant if the vehicle were thought to contain
incriminating evidence.7' The third category of impound is found in
Vehicle Code section 22651. Subdivision (i) authorizes impoundment
of cars with out-of-state registrations which collect, in a period of five
or more days, at least five parking tckets to which the owner does not
respond. Subdivision (j) provides that an illegally parked vehicle
without license plates or other evidence of registration may be im-
pounded -until the owner presents evidence of his identity and a Cali-
fornia address to the police. Section 22651 contains no reference to in-
ventory.
68. In 1967 California Health and Safety Code section 11611 was repealed. Cal.
Stat. 1967, ch. 280, at 1437.
69. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14602 (West 1971).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 22655.
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Except for the three foregoing provisions, there is no statutory au-
thority for police impound of motor vehicles in California. Neverthe-
less, virtually al of the cases treating the inventory search have posited
a right, under California Vehicle Code section 22651, to impound a
vehicle found abandoned or rendered driverless by an arrest. 2 In such
a situation "impound" is a misnomer for a peace officer's power under
section 22651 to "remove a vehicle from a highway"73 and take it to
"the nearest garage or other place of safety or to a garage designated or
maintained by the governmental agency of which [he] is a member."74
The vehicle is not to be impounded, but must be placed in storage at
the place to which it is taken,75 where upon payment of charges it is
accessible to the owner. No specific authority to inventory appears in
section 22651 or in any of the other statutes authorizing removal.
One major pre-Mozzetti case did observe the difference between
the right of the police to impound a vehicle and the right only to re-
move it from the highway, but did not base its holding on the distinc-
tion. In Virgil v. Superior Court76 the petitioner was stopped and
arrested by the California Highway Patrol for reckless driving. At the
time of his arrest he was carrying two passengers in the automobile, nei-
ther of whom was arrested. After arresting Virgil, however, the offi-
cers inventoried the car prior to "impounding" it under Vehicle Code
section 22651, subdivision h of which provides that:
Any member of the California Highway Patrol. .. may remove a
vehicle from a highway under the following circumstances:
(h) When an officer arrests any person driving or in con-
trol of a vehicle for an alleged offense and the officer is by this
code or other law required or permitted to take and does take the
person arrested before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 77
During the course of the inventory marijuana was found, and Virgil
and his passengers were arrested for possession of marijuana. The
trial court refused to grant a motion to suppress and the three defend-
ants sought prohibition. The court of appeal issued the writ, restraining
the use of the evidence which it found had been illegally seized.
72. E.g., People v. Collier, 169 Cal. App. 2d 19, 336 P.2d 582 (1959). Contra,
Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968).
73. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651 (West 1971).
74. Id. § 22850.
75. Id. Requirements for giving notice of storage to the registered owner are
set forth in id. §§ 22852, 22854. Execution of a storage lien under id. § 22851 requires
additional notice.
76. 268 Cal. App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968).
77. Id. at 130 n.2, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 795 n.2 (emphasis added).
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According to the Virgil court the officers had no right to im-
pound or even to remove the vehicle.
We will not challenge the bona fides of the decision of Officer
Ewing to arrest petitioner Virgil for reckless driving and to take
him before a magistrate. We do not even challenge the officers'
[sic] right to cause the Chevrolet to be removed from the highway
(assuming the car then to have been on a highway). We do
challenge and we negate the necessity or the legality of taking the
Virgil car into custody. . . . Virgil had been arrested for a traf-
fic violation; nothing more. Such an arrest alone could "not have
justified a search of the car. . .. The traffic violation did not
involve any forfeiture of the automobile nor was there anything
else that had happened which would reasonably justify a search.
... The burden was upon the prosecution. . . therefore. . . to
explain that an impounding of the car was necessary. Virgil was
not alone. No reason appears why his friends could not have
taken charge of the vehicle. 78
Although the Virgil opinion does not make clear whether a proper
removal, as distinct from an impound, would be sufficient to permit a
warrantless search of the car without probable cause-i.e., a pure in-
ventory-it does establish the principle that inventoried evidence is in-
admissible unless the taking into oustody was necessary in the first place.
The same court in People v. Superior Court" held that a proper re-
moval entailed such custody as would justify an inventory, citing only
California authority. The issue is, however, too important to under-
standing Cooper8° to settle without reference to that case.
The extent to which Cooper justifies the pure inventory remains
uncertain because under the facts of that case the car was impressed
with the sovereign's imminent future title interest. The Court may have
felt that by the time the forfeiture procedure was four months old, the
nexus between the car and Mr. Cooper's protected Fourth Amendment
interests had been dissolved. The notion of "protection" of the offi-
cers appears in the opinion as an entirely offhand makeweight, and quite
possibly has no bearing on the decision at all.81 The only real use the
Supreme Court has made of a protection argument is in characterizing
noninvestigatory conduct undertaken for the protection of the car, as
distinct from the searchers, as something other than a search in Harris.
That tantalizing obiter remark in Cooper remains the only high court
reference to the concept of a self-interested protective search exempt
from Fourth Amendment considerations.
78. Id. at 132, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 796. Mozzetti is to be applied retroactively.
People v. Denman, 19 Cal. App. 3d 632, 97 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1971).
79. 275 Cal. App. 2d 631, 80 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1969).
80. Discussed in text accompanying notes 17-30 supra.
81. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967).
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If the Supreme Court has vouchsafed little explication of the place
of the inventory in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the courts of
California have been a compensatorily fecund source of judicial thought
on the subject. As will appear from the following sections, most of
that thought has been directed toward placing the inventory outside the
confines of the Fourth Amendment altogether.
The No-Seizure Theory
According to the no-seizure theory, when a police officer takes le-
gal possession of a car under an impound or removal statute he gains
legal possession of all the contents in the vehicle. Therefore, anything
he later discovers while searching or inventorying the vehicle was al-
ready in his legal possession and no seizure occurs when the items are
removed from the vehicle.
The equation between lawful custody of the car and lawful pos-
session of whatever is found in it springs full-grown from People v.
Baker,82 which is not an inventory case. There the defendant was ar-
rested for drunk driving, in violation of former California Vehicle Code
section 502 (now section 23102).83 The arresting officers were obliged
under former section 73684 to take the defendant before a magis-
trate, and were "authorized" by former section 58585 to remove his car
from the highway and put it in a place of safety. They exercised their
authority by placing the car in a private storage garage, and took the
defendant to jail.
Under the circumstances the officers legally took possession of...[the] car for safekeeping. The evidence shows that just as the
officers were leaving the Oceanside jail where they had left the
defendant after "booking" him, they received a call. . . from their
office asking whether they had found a gun on the defendant. On
receiving [giving?-RCH] a negative answer, Shannon was in-
structed by his office to check the car. He testified that the night
watchman let him into the garage where the car was stored and
after checking the glove compartment, he noticed the gun under
the front seat on the driver's side. Since the defendant's automo-
bile was legally in the possession of the officers, the gun involved
was also legally in their possession and under the circumstances it
82. 135 Cal. App. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 510 (1955).
83. CAL. STAT. 1935, ch. 27, § 502, at 174 (now CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102(a)
(West 1971) ).
84. CAL. STAT. 1935, ch. 27, § 736(d), at 237 (now CAL. VEH. CODE § 40302
(d) (West 1971) ).
85. CAL. STAT. 1945, ch. 459, § 4(b)(6), at 958 (now CAL. VaH. CODE § 22651
(h) (West 1971) ).
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was legally obtained. The [exclusionary rule] has no application
under the circumstances existing in the present case. 86
One of the problems with Baker is that the car was not in the officers'
custody at the time it was searched. The same court, however, has ap-
parently bridged the gap to its own satisfaction, since in People v.
Collier7 it said of a robbery arrestee's automobile, which, like Baker's,
had been taken to a commercial garage, "The car was impounded by
the officers and apparently they had a present right of access to it."88
The no-seizure theory was relied on to justify an actual inventory
in People v. Ortiz."9 In Ortiz the defendant had been arrested under
a city ordinance for being drunk- in his car. The officers inventoried it
prior to having it towed away under the predecessor of section 22651
(section 585) and found marijuana. The exclusionary rule was
deemed inapplicable.
Defendant's car was legally in Officer Hopkins' possession as an
incident of its impounding. Its contents also were legally in his
possession. Therefore possession of the marijuana was legally
obtained by the officer. Where an automobile is lawfully in the
custody of a peace officer, such contraband articles as are con-
tained in it are legally in the possession of such officer . . . and
[the exclusionary rule] has no application.9"
The same ex cathedra approach to inventory appeared soon after
Ortiz in People v. Nebbit,9 a leading case frequently relied upon to sup-
port detailed searches of remote portions of stopped cars. There two
policemen observed a car with no front license plate. They made a
U-turn and, upon observing that the vehicle also lacked a rear plate,
stopped it. There were no papers in the car relating to ownership. A
sticker on the windshield indicated that it had been sold by one Curtis to
Lillian Smith. The driver of the vehicle stated that Curtis had lent
it to him while the driver's own car was being fixed. Nebbit, the pas-
senger, corroborated the story. Neither knew anything about the Smith
interest in the vehicle. They were both arrested for unlawful taking of
the car.92
86. 135 Cal. App. 2d at 4-5, 286 P.2d at 511-12; accord, People v. Hickens,
165 Cal. App. 2d 364, 331 P.2d 796 (1958) (alternative holding).
87. 169 Cal. App. 2d 19, 336 P.2d 582 (1959).
88. Id. at 22, 336 P.2d at 584. The case affords no discussion of the issue, and
may actually turn upon plain sight.
89. 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (alternative holding).
90. Id. at 250-51, 305 P.2d at 147.
91. 183 Cal. App. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960) (alternative holding).
92. The arrest was made under a statute which covers both theft and joy riding.
CAL. STAT. 1935, ch. 27, § 503, at 174-75 (now CAL. VEn. CODE § 10851 (West
1971) ). "Straight joy riding is made criminal by CAL. PEN. CODE § 499b (West
1970).
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The actual intrusion which followed was minute compared to
many for which it is the judicial prototype.
Thereafter, as a normal procedure before impounding the vehicle,
the officers began an inventory of all personal property found
therein. [Officer] Maloof picked up a jacket on the front seat
where defendant had been sitting and noticed in plain sight a
brownish cigarette; he did not know whether it had fallen out of thejacket or had been lying under it. However, inasmuch as it ap-
peared to him to be marijuana, the officer then searched the jacket
and found another such cigarette in the left hand pocket.
Actually, the officer's observation of the cigarette was
not the result of a search, for it appeared in plain sight in the
normal course of the reasonable and valid activity of the officer in
making the inventory, incidental to impounding the car ...
Believing the cigarette to contain marijuana, it was then
proper for the officer to make a search of the vehicle and of de-
fendant's jacket. .... 93
Apparently, the inventory had turned into a legitimate search be-
fore Officer Maloof went into Mr. Nebbit's jacket pocket. The court
thought that the jacket was subject to search both because the brownish
color of the cigarette furnished reason to suspect contraband, and be-
cause "a search without a warrant is valid where incident to a lawful
arrest if reasonably made and in good faith."94  As an alternative
means of supporting the judgment, the court added that "no seizure
existed, for both the first cigarette and the second found in defendant's
jacket were legally in the possession of the officers." '95 It is the latter
proposition for which Nebbit is most often cited.
Under the no-seizure theory the sequence of police activities is
made constitutionally significant. Although a search and seizure must
stand the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness, the no-seizure the-
ory permits disposing of a seizure and search under the local law of
bailment. Local law is sufficient because the seizure, like the pea be-
neath the walnut shell, has disappeared in the course of changing posi-
tion. The goods were not seized when the car was taken into custody
because the officer was merely acting as bailee of something he had a
duty to protect, and they were also not seized when turned up in the
course of a subsequent search of the car because the process of manu-
caption had already been completed.
Easy as it is to criticize the no-seizure approach, one should bear in
mind that dissatisfaction arises in large part from the result. Given the
93. 183 Cal. App. 2d at 455, 460, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11, 13-14.
94. Id. at 461, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
95. Id. at 460-61, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
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fact that taking charge of the car and going through it was considered
nontrespassory under local law, it would have been a formidable in-
novation for an intermediate appellate court to hold the conduct un-
reasonable before Katz v. United States." The urge to find a way
around the Fourth Amendment altogether was thus at once compelling
and, as the history of inventory law makes clear, difficult to satisfy
without appearing somewhat muddle-headed.
It is fitting to close a section on no-seizure with as egregious an
example of disposing of fundamental rights by trifling distinctions as
the reported cases can provide. In People v. Simpson9" the police
found four youthful persons sleeping in a parked car. All were ar-
rested for vagrancy and taken to the police station, where two male sus-
pects were booked on the additional charges of contributing to the de-
linquency of minors and white slavery. The car was left unattended at
the scene of arrest until after booking.
One narcotic officer then said he suspicioned they were trans-
porting marijuana in that car and he wanted to search it. An-
other officer said he was going out to impound the car and take it
to the garage where they ordinarily kept impounded cars. They
left together.98
The relative alacrity of the two policemen in reaching their mutual ob-
jective was crucial, since to the court whether or not the subsequent en-
try of the car was a search incident to the questionable arrests depended
upon whether Tweedledee or Tweedledum reached the vehicle first.
The second officer proved the quicker and the marijuana he found was
therefore admissible, he having gained lawful custody of everything in
the vehicle by conducting an inventory.9
The No-Objection Theory
The no-objection theory holds that while an inventory is a search,
it is a reasonable search and therefore not prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment even though it is made without a warrant and without
probable cause. The classic justification for the inventory-search is
"protection" against theft or false claims. Thus in People v.- Ortiz,
100
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (nontrespassory eavesdropping via electronic device
held to violate the Fourth Amendment).
97. 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339 P.2d 156 (1959).
98. Id. at 528, 339 P.2d at 159.
99. The no-seizure holding is alternative. The opinion also rests on the no-
objection theory, since the court considered the inventory a reasonable sort of search.
100. 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 89-90 supra).
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in a holding alternative to the no-seizure theory, the court reasoned
as follows:
[I]t was not unreasonable for the police officer to make an inven-
tory of the contents of the automobile prior to impounding it. Such
inventory was a protection to the owner of the vehicle, the garage
owner, and the officer. Since the marijuana was found during the
course of making the inventory, it was not discovered as a result of
an unreasonable search and therefore it was not inadmissible in
evidence. 101
A somewhat more articulate statement of the theory that an in-
ventory is a reasonable search was made in People v. Roth,10 2 where
the defendant first came to the attention of the authorities when his car
overturned on the highway. All occupants, including Roth, were
thrown out of the vehicle and were taken from the site in an ambulance.
The highway patrol ordered the car towed under California Vehicle
Code sections 22651(b) and 2 2 65 1(g), and one Officer Lee proceeded
to make an inventory of its contents. In the passenger compartment a
number of articles were jumbled together; possibly some property had
been thrown out of the vehicle as well. In the course of assembling the
property, the officer went through the pockets of a jacket and found a
pouch. He then opened the pouch and discovered marijuana. The
jacket was subsequently identified as Roth's, and the contraband intro-
duced into evidence against him.
The court of appeal overturned the trial court's order suppressing
the evidence, stating:
[I]f the customary protective measure used by the California
Highway Patrol to safeguard the vehicle and its contents while law-
fully in its custody be considered a search within the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, under the conditions
here presented it was not unreasonable . . . . [T]he injury and
hospitalization of the occupants of the Volkswagen [necessitated]
the taking and listing of their property for safekeeping .... 103
The court relied upon the Cooper dictum to conclude that it was rea-
sonable to permit the officer to search a vehicle which was in his cus-
tody.
The main flaw of the Roth approach, and of the no-objection the-
ory in general, is that it takes no account of privacy as a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. To extend Cooper to short-term police
custody of a car which remains the property of the owner is to find the
entirely speculative benefits of protection against false claims more im-
101. Id. at 250, 305 P.2d at 147.
102. 261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968) (alternative holding).
103. Id. at 437, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54.
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portant than the ends of law enforcement which gave way to privacy
in, say, Sibron and Katz. Moreover, extension of Cooper to mere re-
moval would give rise to such anomalies as the policeman who makes
an inventory of a nonmobile car while his colleague is seeking a war-
rant to search it.
The Supreme Court has not returned to Rabinowitz with such
fervor as to uphold a search without probable cause in the interests of
the public fise and private property. Even Chambers specifically re-
states the requirement of probable cause as a precondition to reason-
ableness under the Fourth Amendment. Until the weight of privacy in
the judicial balance is reduced far below its present value the no-objec-
tion theory will remain unconvincing.
The No-Search Theory
The no-search theory takes an appealingly simple approach. It
circumvents the necessity for consideration of constitutional problems
by simply declaring that an inventory is not a search.
In Roth the court in an alternative holding stated:
It is a readily apparent that Officer Lee was making no "search" of.
the Volkswagen; he was not looking for narcotics; all he did was
make an inventory of the contents [so] that they could be stored
in a place of safety; and in the course of his official duty he dis-
covered the contraband.
That the discovery of the contraband was not the result of
a search of the Volkswagen but of a measure taken to protect
the car and its contents which were lawfully in the officer's custody
finds support in Harris v. United States .... 104
The reliance on Harris,0 5 previously discussed, was misplaced.
In Harris the Supreme Court authorized some invasion of the interior
of a car in ordinary police custody as an incident of acts necessary to
protect the vehicle itself. The mere rolling up of a window in the
Harris case is a far distance in Fourth Amendment theory from full
scale invasion of the car and its contents. Nor does assertion that the
deed is done for the owner's benefit supply a satisfactory rationale for
forfeiture of the right of privacy.
The cavalier manner in which the inventory enthusiast obliterates
the distinction between a Harris fortuity and a forthright invasion of
recesses designed to provide privacy is illustrated by People v. Nor-
104. Id. at 436, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
105. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 34-37 supra).
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ris,11 6 where the reason for an officer's ferreting seemed to turn metal
transparent for the Los Angeles Appellate Division. The defendant's
truck had been damaged in an intersection accident and was about to be
towed. A police officer making an inventory searched the glove com-
partment and found an unlawful firearm. The court found the com-
parison to plain sight compelling:
Officers in making an inventory are no more searching than
when they look through an open door, or into a car, or around a
room they have entered to make a lawful arrest under a warrant.
In none of these cases are they required to close their eyes to that
which comes into plain sight while they are engaged in such non-
search activity. 10 7
It seems needful to do little but state the no-search theory in order
to discredit it. In any event, the Mozzetti opinion convincingly rejects
the simplistic semantic approach and obviates the necessity of detailed
criticism at this point.' 8
Pre-Mozzetti Dissatisfaction with Inventory Theory
The decision which might have been expected to serve as the lead-
ing case in the field before Mozzetti was critical of inventories. Oddly
enough, it was widely ignored by intermediate appellate judges, though
it emanated from the highest court of the state. In People v. Burke'0 9
the defendant was loitering at the entrance to an office building in a
frequently burglarized neighborhood before normal business hours, and
was arrested when he could give no satisfactory explanation for his pres-
ence. 1 0 "Defendant was taken to the police station, and his car was
towed to the police impound lot, where [before 3:00 that afternoon]
the trunk was opened and searched by police officers."'' The officers
found evidence connecting Burke with a previous burglary. No war-
rant had been sought.
In a 5-2 dccision ' 12 the Supreme Court of California reversed
106. 262 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 897, 68 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1968).
107. Id. at 899, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
108. See text accompanying notes 129-34 infra.
109. 61 Cal. 2d 575, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1964).
110. Id. at 577, 394 P.2d at 68, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 532. The opinion does not
reveal whether Burke's arrest was for loitering or for burglary. A station house
search after towaway has been upheld as incident to an arrest by distinguishing Burke
as an unlawful arrest case. See People v. Upton, 257 Cal. App. 2d 677, 681, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 103, 106 (1968). The Burke opinion does not, however, question the lawfulness
of the arrest.
111. 61 Cal. 2d at 577-78, 394 P.2d at 68, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
112. Chief Justice Gibson wrote the opinion with Justices Traynor, Peek, Peters,
and Tobriner in the majority.
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Burke's burglary conviction. The opinion proceeds from the proposi-
tion that the evidence would be inadmissible in the absence of an ex-
ception to "the constitutional rule that a search warrant must be had
before a search may be made.""' 3  Upon review of the authorities,
Chief Justice Gibson concluded that the case before him was close
enough to Preston"4 to preclude upholding the search of the trunk as
an incident of the arrest." 5 The court then turned to the other ground
urged by the People for admissibility of the evidence.
Our attention has been called by the People to section 22651
of the Vehicle Code, which provides that a police officer may re-
move a vehicle from a highway "(h) when an officer arrests any
person driving or in control of a vehicle for an alleged offense and
the officer is by this code or other law required or permitted to
take and does take the person arrested before a magistrate with-
out unnecessary delay." Reference is also made to section 22850,
which permits the storage of such a vehicle in a place designated or
maintained by the governmental agency of which the officer is a
member. The officers were authorized by these sections to remove
defendant's car from the highway and impound it but the sections
do not purport to authorize the making of a search." 6
Thus, the majority apparently rejected not only the no-seizure theory
but the no-search and (possibly) the no-objection theories as well.
Dissenting Justices Schauer and McComb, however, felt the inventory
point was well taken.
Furthermore, I believe it to be predominantly in the public
interest-including the interest of an innocent owner-that an
automobile lawfully taken into possession by a police officer...
be searched and its contents inventoried as soon as reason-
ably possible. Such search and inventory appear to me to be not
only the right but the duty of the officer taking custody." i7
One might have expected Burke to have ended use of evidence
seized during an inventory in California. However, it was virtually
ignored by the lower courts," 8 possibly because it neither specifically
repudiated the no-search cases nor considered the constitutional stand-
ard of reasonableness.
Notwithstanding the short shrift accorded Burke, the inventory did
113. 61 Cal. 2d at 579, 394 P.2d at 69, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
114. Discussed in text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
115. It has sometimes been suggested that Preston applies only to cases where the
circumstances of the arrest create no logical suspicion that there is physical evidence to
be found. Burke would appear to make that argument difficult to maintain in Cal-
ifornia.
116. 61 Cal. 2d at 580, 394 P.2d at 70, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
117. Id. at 581, 394 P.2d at 70, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
118. See, e.g., People v. Marchese, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1007, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525
(1969); People v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 631, 80 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1969).
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not meet with entirely uncritical acceptance before Mozzetti. In People
v. Upton' 19 the court of appeal reversed the lower court's dismissal of
an information based on evidence found in a suitcase opened in the
course of inventorying the defendant's car at the station house. Upon
stopping a vehicle for driving on the wrong side of a street, one Offi-
cer Conlin discovered that the driver had no registration papers for
the car and was wanted on a traffic warrant. Moreover, the official
ownership records failed to tally with ownership information supplied
by the driver. The officer arrested the driver, Mr. Upton, on the war-
rant and for auto theft, and directed him to drive the vehicle to the sta-
tion house. There, about fifteen minutes after the defendant was
booked, Officer Conlin began making an inventory of the contents of
the car "prior to impounding it" for conventional inventory purposes
and also to see whether the car contained any documents of registra-
tion.1 20
In a suitcase under the back seat Officer Conlin found a substance
resembling marijuana. In another closed suitcase in the trunk he and
another officer came upon several small, brick-shaped packages which,
upon being opened, were found to contain the same material. The in-
vestigation of ownership indicated that the last officially registered
owner had sold the vehicle. Apparently, the car was not stolen, and
nothing developed to contradict Upton's explanation. The trial judge
stated that he thought the search reasonable but felt compelled to ex-
clude the marijuana by the original opinion, thereafter vacated, in Peo-
ple v. Webb.' 2' The court of appeal thus received the People's appeal
with an explicit finding of subjective reasonableness, to be considered
in the light of Preston and Cooper and the California Supreme Court
decisions in Burke and Webb.
Of primary interest here is that the court did not dismiss the in-
ventory cases as lacking application because of the dual purpose of the
officer's efforts. Rather, it treated at some length the issue of whether
the inventory power would itself justify the search.
Thus, the police could not search defendant's car simply on the
basis of an arrest for a traffic violation. . . nor do we think that
the Constitution permits an otherwise unreasonable search of a car
simply because the police have statutory authority to impound it
under Vehicle Code, sections 22650 and 22651. We are not un-
mindful that a number of cases appear to hold that the police may
119. 257 Cal. App. 2d 677, 65 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1968).
120. Id. at 679-80, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
121. Id. at 680, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 106. The vacated Webb opinion is at 243 Cal.
App. 2d 179, 52 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1966).
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always inventory the contents of a car prior to impounding it, re-
gardless of the reason for the arrest .... With the exception of
Baker, Ortiz and Gil, which imply that the police have the right
to inventory the contents of a car prior to impounding it on a drunk
driving arrest, none of the other cases, however, authorize the
search of a car merely because it was impounded. . . but in each
there was an added factor which rendered the search reasonable. 1 22
Having perceived that constitutional problems arise from a search
without probable cause, and that those problems have been quite regu-
larly ignored by intermediate appellate tribunals in California, the Up-
ton court attempted to set the California law on inventories aright by
finding the "added factor" in most of the cases to be something like
probable cause to search. 12
3
This case is like Webb . . . in that in both cases there was cause
to believe that defendant had committed a serious felony (in our
case, auto theft). This fact distinguishes the present case from
Preston in which the arrest was for vagrancy, a minor offense,
and from Burke where the arrest was merely because defendant
acted suspiciously in an area where numerous burglaries had re-
cently occurred. 1 24
Even though it turns on incidence and cites Webb, Upton is clear on
the points that Cooper adds something to the power of the police search,
and that the increment, whatever it may be, is not limited to forfeiture
cases. Despite a rather lengthy opinion, however, the court never does
explain exactly why there was no need for a warrant,'25 its references
to Cooper appearing more invocation than application. Theoretically,
it might even have rested on Carroll, since the car was not technically
impounded.
122. 257 Cal. App. 2d at 682-83, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
123. Insofar as the added factor is not probable cause but incidence, the rationale
cannot survive Chimel. Nevertheless Upton is cited in a post-Chimel case for the
proposition that an entire car can be searched for evidence of ownership incidentally
to an arrest for auto theft. People v. Mermuys, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 1088, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 902, 905 (1969) (alternative holding).
124. 257 Cal. App. 2d at 684-685, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 108. The opinion treats
Burke as a no-probable-cause case, rather than as one in which the incidence was
attenuated by the removal of the car from the arrest scene. That reading differs, of
course, from what the Burke court appears to have thought it was doing, but does
not detract from the principle that impound will not justify a search in the absence of
probable cause or an equivalent "added factor."
125. The court does advert to the "totality of the circumstances" as justifying the
admission of the marijuana, id. at 681, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 106, but that locution can be
only a referent in applying a rule, not a rule itself. The search was also described as
"substantially contemporaneous with the arrest," id. at 682, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 107, but
no serious attempt was made to characterize it as incident to apprehending the de-
fendant.
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The Mozzetti Decision
The confusion created by the various approaches to inventories
that existed in the lower courts even after Burke made another attempt
by the California Supreme Court to resolve the controversy most de-
sirable. On June 5, 1970, the court was presented with a petition for
a writ of mandate by one Sharon Mozzetti, seeking to suppress the use
of evidence turned -up in the course of an inventory. The court issued
the writ in an opinion which appears virtually to end the use of inven-
toried evidence in California. 126
The petitioner in Mozzetti had not been arrested. The case there-
fore presents the "pure" inventory situation in which the police assume
control of the car strictly for the purpose of removing it to a place of
safety.'27  There is nothing to suggest that the police went through the
petitioner's belongings for any purpose other than to complete the stand-
ard inventory form. The course of events followed a pattern which
has become familiar:
In the course of his inventory, the officer saw a small suit-
case on the back seat of the car. Finding the suitcase unlocked he
opened it, apparently to determine if it contained any articles of
value. Inside he found a plastic bag containing a quantity of
marijuana. Because petitioner's automobile was a convertible, at
the conclusion of the inventory several items found in the car's in-
terior, including the suitcase, were locked in the trunk. The car
was then towed to a police storage garage and the keys were later
turned over to the petitioner. The marijuana, of course, was
seized. 1 28
Motions to suppress the marijuana were denied.
Upon review of most of the reported inventory cases the court was
unable to find a "persuasive rationale" to justify use of the evidence.12 1
Mr. Justice Mosk's opinion characterizes the no-search cases as resting
upon a "circumscribed, semantic approach.' 30  From brief considera-
tion of the reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to create cate-
gories of governmental invasion outside the constitutional definition of
a search in Terry v. Ohio,"' Camara v. Municipal Court, 1 2 and Harris
126. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412
(1971). For similar reasoning on booking searches see Carpio v. Superior Court, 19
Cal. App. 3d 790, 97 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1971); cf. Agar v. Superior Court. 21 Cal. App.
3d 24, - Cal. Rptr. - (1971).
127. The statutes involved were California Vehicle Code sections 22651(b), (g),
and 22850.
128. 4 Cal. 3d at 702, 484 P.2d at 85, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
129. Id. at 703, 484 P.2d at 86, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
130. Id. at 704, 484 P.2d at 87, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
131. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
132. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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v. United States,133 the court concluded:
Purely and simply the police inventory conducted here was a
police search. Therefore, we disapprove those cases which have
suggested that a police inventory may be validated without refer-
ence to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.134
The respondent's contention that custody of the car carried with it such
custody of its contents as to circumvent constitutional objections to in-
ventorying them-the no-seizure theory-was likewise rejected in rela-
tively summary fashion.
It is clear that mere legal custody of an automobile by the
police does not create some new possessory right to justify the
search of that vehicle. In Cooper v. California . . . the United
States Supreme Court pointed out that "'lawful custody of an au-
tomobile does not of itself dispense with constitutional requirements
of searches thereafter made of it.'" The court indicated that "the
reason for and nature of the custody may constitutionally justify
the search," and it held that custody of an automobile held as evi-
dence of crime and pending forfeiture was such custody.135
The bulk of the opinion is devoted to considering whether on bal-
ance public policy justifies the inventory as a reasonable and thus con-
stitutionally permissible intrusion-the no-objection theory. Mr. Jus-
tice Mosk begins with what is termed a "review [of] the manner in
which the Fourth Amendment has been applied to searches of auto-
mobiles,""' which unfortunately does not expressly distinguish be-
tween searches which are improper because the police, having probable
cause, dispensed with a warrant which should have been obtained, and
those whose defect is a lack of probable cause to search. For the most
part, Mozetti in effect considers the inventory simply an unsuccessful
candidate for inclusion in the limited class of exceptions to the war-
rant requirement recognized by Chimel. Only briefly near the end of
the opinion does the court come to grips with the fact that the inventory
proponents are not merely requesting approval of a special situation for
a warrantless search under the exigency exception, but are demanding
that a search for which a warrant would be refused be recognized as
reasonable.
It is undeniable that, under the facts before us, as in the in-
133. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (discussed in text accompanying notes 34-37 supra).
134. 4 Cal. 3d at 706, 484 P.2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The court is speaking
of the search of the contents of the suitcase. The act of listing the contents in
plain view was not considered a search. Id. at 707, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at
417.
135. Id. at 710-11, 484 P.2d at 91, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 419. The court also refers,
perhaps a bit wistfully, to its rejection of the inventory argument in Burke. Id.
136. Id. at 706, 484 P.2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
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ventory context generally, there could be no basis upon which a
magistrate might issue a search warrant. The inventory, by its
nature, involves a random search of the articles left in an auto-
mobile taken into police custody; the police are looking for nothing
in particular and everything in general. But this fact does notjustify the search and establish its constitutionality. To the con-
trary, a random police search is the precise invasion of privacy
which the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit.137
One may justifiably wonder whether, if the problem had been
more clearly stated at the outset, it would have been necessary for the
court to engage in balancing interests. The foregoing passage strongly
suggests that the Mozzetti court considers the search without probable
cause illegal per se. Nevertheless, it is difficult to quarrel with the
manner in which the court did weigh the various interests advanced to
justify the inventory. In the process of disposing of the "protection" ar-
guments the court makes some statements about first principles which
are, in the context of inventory cases, remarkable for their good sense.
The opinion first observes that in none of the cases in favor of the in-
ventory is it suggested that the police do or should ask the owner of the
property to be safeguarded what he wants done.138  It next demolishes
the bromide that the inventory is necessary for the protection of the po-
lice as bailees by pointing out that the duty of care actually imposed
on them by law is amply fulfilled by rolling up windows and locking
doors." 9  The law of bailment affecting the garageman is then con-
siderably clarified by the court's application of the decision in Homan v.
Burkhart... to the storers of towed vehicles on the grounds that as de-
positaries for hire, they could not be held liable for failure to protect val-
uables of whose presence in the vehicle he was not informed. Al-
though that extension of Homan is logical enough, it was by no means
137. Id. at 711, 484 P.2d at 92, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
138. As the court points out, in the Gil case the police countermanded the
owner's express instructions on the disposition of his property. Id. at 708 n.2, 484
P.2d at 89 n.2, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417 n.2. It is interesting to compare Martinez v.
Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 569, 87 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1970), where the court appar-
ently assumed that the intoxicated condition of the driver operated to vitiate his
preference for private care of his vehicle, no doubt believing that a person in full
possession of his faculties would prefer to have the police rummage through his
possessions.
139. 4 Cal. 3d at 708, 484 P.2d at 89-90, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
140. 108 Cal. App. 363, 291 P. 624 (1930). Before Mozzetti there may have
been some distinctions among the duties owing owners of the various classes of cars
which may be removed, since the degree of carelessness toward their own property
differs; not even the ordinary duties of a bailee can be thrust upon another. Gordon
H. Ball, Inc. v. Parreira, 214 Cal. App. 2d 697, 29 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1963). But cf.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1815-16 (West 1954).
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obvious, since it might have been argued that the owner of a towed
vehicle is deprived of the opportunity to point out the presence of the
valuables.
In the court's analysis, the state interests on the side of the inven-
tory appear so slight as to provide no occasion for balancing against the
owner's interest in privacy. The court does, however, go to the trou-
ble of weighing the purported benefits to the owner himself.
The interests of a vehicle owner are said to be protected by
police inventory because the procedure provides the owner with a
detailed list of the articles taken into custody by the police, an in-
temization [sic] he can use in making valid claims for loss or
damage against the police and the storage bailee. Also, the in-
ventory brings to light articles of special value or of a perishable na-
ture which might require unusual care by the police and the storage
bailee.
This contention is rebutted by recognition of the vehicle own-
dr's countervailing interests in maintaining the privacy of his per-
sonal effects and preventing anyone, including the police, from
searching suitcases, and other closed containers and areas in his
automobile at the time the police lawfully remove it to storage. In
weighing the necessity of the inventory search as protection of the
owner's property against the owner's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, we observe that items of value left in an automobile
to be stored by the police may be adequately protected merely by
rolling up the windows, locking the vehicle doors and returning the
keys to the owner. The owner himself, if required to leave his car
temporarily, could do no more to protect his property. In the in-
stant case, because the automobile involved was a convertible,
adequate protection of valuables could be achieved by raising the
top or, if necessary, by moving visible items, like the small suit-
case, into the trunk for safekeeping. 141
The majority opinion, granting the writ, was joined by the Chief
Justice and by Justices Peters, Tobriner and Sullivan. Mr. Justice
Burke concurred in a separate opinion in which he emphasized his be-
lief that there is a responsibility to inventory the items which are in
plain sight within the vehicle and, if necessary, to transfer them to some
secure place. 142  Mr. Justice McComb's dissent is perhaps too terse to
support comment as to his reasoning, but since it is based on the
"harmless error" provision of the state constitution, it necessarily breaks
some new ground by extending that doctrine to the field of extraordi-
nary writs before judgment. Whether he felt the concept was appli-
cable because introduction of the marijuana and related testimony
141. 4 Cal. 3d at 707, 484 P.2d at 88-89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17. From the
standpoint of constitutional law, it may be somewhat anomalous to balance against a
Fourth Amendment interest the benefits of a search which has no state purpose at all.
142. Id. at 712, 484 P.2d at 92-93, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 420-21.
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would not seriously prejudice the defendant at her trial for possession or
because there could be no miscarriage of justice in convicting one found
in possession of that substance does not appear from his opinion.
The concurring opinion does not in fact differ from that of the
majority in the important respect of authorizing such trespass to the
chattels within the car as may be involved in (1) making an inventory
of "[a]ny objects clearly visible without probing,"14 3 or (2) opening
the trunk (or, presumably, any other lockable recess) for the purpose of
placing valuables therein if for some reason the passenger compartment
could not be locked.14  It may therefore be argued that Mozzetti does
not in fact overturn such cases as People v. Ortiz' 45 Moreover, the
quantum of poking about necessary to constitute "probing" remains
problematic.' 46 A citizen's expectations of privacy founded on com-
mon experience might well be frustrated by an expertly conducted
"hands off" search once the officer is empowered to enter the vehicle
for the purpose of making a plain sight inventory. The potential for
such frustration is greater, of course, in those situations where the po-
lice are authorized to open the trunk. That the Mozzetti opinion limits
the latter practice to convertibles with inoperative tops (readily extensi-
ble, one supposes, to sedans with broken wind wings, etc.), does not
dispel the constitutional questions.' 47
The No-Cause Search After Mozzetti
In essence, the Mozzetti response to the no-cause search conundrum
is to reduce the scope of the inventory so far as to be able to declare that
it is no longer a search at all, and is thus outside the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment. The case, then, like Harris v. United States, 148
represents a more sophisticated version of the "semantic approach." It
143. Id. at 707, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
144. Id.
145. 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 89-90 & 100-01 supra).
146. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 636, 84 Cal. Rptr. 81
(1970) (seizure of contraband observed on front seat of car in light of officer's flash-
light not unreasonable); People v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 131, 82 Cal. Rptr.
507 (1969) (observing uncovered typewriter in office and checking serial number not
unreasonable search); People v. Sjosten, 262 Cal. App. 2d 539, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832
(1968) (seizure of record player viewable through car window with flashlight not un-
reasonable)
147. Strictly speaking, Mozzetti also leaves open the issue of the inventory in the
case of an actual impound, such as occurred in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967) (discussed in text accompanying notes 17-30 supra).
148. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (discussed in text accompanying notes 34-37 supra).
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remains to consider whether by shifting the inquiry from the grosser
forms of invasion, such as rifling a suitcase, to the more tenuous area of
things "in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the posi-
tion to have that view," '149 the court has put the constitutional problems
to rest.
The great source of trouble in the plain sight concept is the dual
nature of the right to be somewhere. Now that the Fourth Amend-
ment has been cut adrift from long-developed notions of trespass, 50
it is insufficient to say that an officer who enters a car in order to list its
contents, or the trunk of the car in order to place valuables there, does
not violate the property interests of the owner. No trespass was com-
mitted by the celebrated police voyeur in Bielicki v. Superior Court,51
who had been authorized by the owner of the premises to assume the
vantage from which Mr. Bielicki's activities were in plain sight. The
Fourth Amendment places limits on the use of observations as evi-
dence in criminal cases, even if the activity necessary to make the ob-
servations is not tortious under local law. At present it still seems that
something like "reasonable expectations of privacy" defines the scope of
the right protected by the amendment. The motor vehicle inventory
supplies an admirable illustration of the difficulties occasioned by the
collision of that concept with the expanding area of putatively benevo-
lent governmental activity.
The persistence of those difficulties is underscored by certain obiter
statements in Mozzetti. First, the court clearly implies that even the
"slight" duty of care imposed on the police under California law re-
quires that they place an absent owner's belongings under lock and
key.' 52  Secondly, it is said they may, if necessary, enter lockable re-
cesses of the vehicle for that purpose.'5 3 While the former precept
raises few constitutional problems in itself,' 4 the latter reopens most of
the issues Mozzetti purports to resolve.
149. Id. at 236.
150. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). But see Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
151. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962); cf. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
152. Since the court is essentially empowering the police to do all that "[tlhe
owner himself, if required to leave his car temporarily, could do . . .to protect his
property," 4 Cal. 3d at 707, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417, either the duty is
actually something like ordinary due care, or it is considered constitutionally reasonable
for the police to do more than their duty requires to protect the public entity from
liability.
153. For example, to place the suitcase in the trunk. Id.
154. Id. at 712-13, 484 P.2d at 92-93, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 420-21 (1971) (Burke, J.,
concurring).
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Resorting to hypothetical illustration, one supposes that if an offi-
cer calls a tow truck for an open sports car, finds a camera on the seat,
is unable to erect the top, opens the glove compartment, observes a
scorched marijuana seed and then goes through all the luggage, 5' noth-
ing he finds will be rendered inadmissible by Mozzetti, since anything
turned up in the process of safeguarding objects in plain view is not
the product of a search, but of the inventory episode. In such a sit-
uation, the concurring opinion of Judge Molinari in People v. An-
drews'56 seems more in accord with reality, when he defines a search
as the process of "looking and taking note." 57  Inasmuch as the entry
is being made not by a neutral guardian of property, but by the police,
who by training, duty and, one presumes, predilection, are inveterate
lookers and note-takers, failure to consider whether the privacy-invad-
ing aspects of the post-Mozzetti inventory are sustainable as reason-
able searches constitutes a sizeable lacuna in that opinion.
Some Constitutional Aspects of Benevolent
Police Intrusions
To consider the questions left unanswered by Mozzetti is to set
sail on seas that are not merely uncharted, but left pointedly incognita
by the eminent cartographers. Governmental activities which are un-
dertaken for some reason unrelated to the detection of crime, but which
more or less regularly bring evidence or material for probable cause to
the attention of law enforcement personnel, are constantly increasing
in number and pervasiveness. One of the ironic effects of Katz" 8 may
be the development of a body of police practices which are trespassory
without violating what the courts consider the reasonable expectations
of privacy of the citizen. In California, the extent to which law en-
forcement officers may, consistent with the demands of the Fourth
Amendment, effect trespasses in the course of their investigative du-
ties is still unsettled.' 59 That those "duties" frequently involve placing
155. Under the present state of the law it seems futile to speculate whether, after
receiving probable cause to search, he should obtain a warrant before opening the suit-
cases. Compare People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1968), with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The issue here is whether
the seed is usable at all.
156. 6 Cal. App. 3d 428, 439-42, 85 Cal. Rptr. 908, 915-18 (1970) (Molinari,
P.J., concurring).
157. Id. at 442, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
158. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
159. Compare Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1962) with People v. Willard, 238 Cal. App. 2d 292, 47 Cal. Rptr. 734
(1965). The investigatory detention of an automobile on the highway raises similar
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oneself in a position from which things which the citizen might reason-
ably have thought private come into plain sight is axiomatic. It follows
under Katz that such activities partake of the essence of the search.
Yet the implications of recognizing them as subject to a constitu-
tional parameter of reasonableness have been sufficiently forbidding
to prompt such flagrant judicial temporizing as reliance on specious con-
sent 0 ° or denomination of any neglectful departure from tight security
as some sort of waiver."0 1
Much agonizing is attributable to the fact that "reasonable" has
both a common sense and a technical meaning. We want the officer
to take the unconscious motorist to the hospital, or to rescue the dog
entangled in its leash inside a parked automobile, and we are accord-
ingly resistant to the notion that any search which he incidentally per-
forms is not reasonable. 162  Yet, with only one overt exception, "[the
United States Supreme] Court has insisted upon probable cause as a
minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitu-
tion.'
1 63
While collision between the practical and libertarian concepts of
a reasonable search may be unnecessary, it appears inevitable without
some judicial clarification of the place of deterrence in our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The unarticulated premise behind the ar-
gument for admitting evidence serendipitously turned up in the course
of a benevolent intrusion may be that the police would be deterred from
doing the praiseworthy act if they were not permitted to use its inci-
dental fruits as evidence. But even if one rejects that negative view of
police motivation, he is still unequipped to choose between two alter-
native conclusions: that evidence found in the course of a post-Moz-
zetti inventory search might as well be admitted, since excluding it will
not deter the police from, e.g., opening the trunk to safeguard valua-
bles, or that it might as well be excluded for the same reason.
questions about "plain sight." See People v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1085,
98 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1971).
160. See Mann v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 472 P.2d 468, 476, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 388 (1970) (Peters, J., dissenting).
161. Such opinions are usually couched in terms of unrealistic findings that the
defendant's expectation of privacy was unreasonable. See, e.g., People v. Berutko,
71 Cal. 2d 84, 93-94, 453 P.2d 721, 730-31, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217, 222-23 (1969)
(dictum). Possibly the bench is developing the notion that a reasonable man would
expect to be under close scrutiny by the government.
162. Cf. People v. Henning, 18 Cal. App. 3d 872, 96 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971).
163. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968). The exceptions represented by the Terry
rationale and the offhand remark about protection in Cooper do not appear to loom
large in the mind of the court.
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In order to make some sense of the application of the exclusionary
rule to an area where the police activity in question is not considered
reprehensible, it will be useful briefly to review some elementary prin-
ciples, beginning with the difference between the functions of the ex-
clusionary rule for a search incident to a lawful arrest and for a search
based on the suspicion that something is to be found. The search
in Mapp was of the latter type, and presented a fairly clear picture of
officers engaged in a ransacking expedition which they would not have
undertaken but for the hope of finding items of evidentiary value. Un-
til brought back into check by Chimel, the former type of search had
encroached considerably into the territory of the latter, so that it was
natural to apply the Mapp rule to so-called incidental searches which
were in fact quests for evidence. But the same officer who is now re-
strained from making a Rabinowitz search by thoughts of exclusion
would presumably proceed with a Chimel incidental search regardless
of the admissibility of what turns up. The incentive of disarming a po-
tentially dangerous antagonist is unaffected by exclusion, and there is
little to lose by searching in an ambiguous situation for destructible evi-
dence within reach of an arrestee. Thus, a limited physical area for
which there is no search warrant, and, more importantly, in which in
many cases there is no cause to believe any evidence will be found, will
regularly be searched regardless of the admissibility of whatever turns
up.1 64j
If, as some suggest, the exclusionary rule should not bar use of
otherwise admissible evidence unless some deterrence of police miscon-
duct will result, 165 then evidence seized in a Chimel-type search inci-
dental to an invalid arrest which was not a pretext ought logically to be
admissible. By the same token, if the motivations of protection re-
ferred to by the courts are actual, there is no reason to exclude evidence
turned up in an inventory simply because the car may have been un-
lawfully seized,166 or because the inventory itself violates the Fourth
Amendment. Most courts applying pre-Mozzetti inventory law consid-
ered the legality of the arrest which occasioned police custody of the
vehicle as a precondition to admissibility of the inventoried evidence.
In People v. Simpson, 167 however, where the validity of the arrests was
164. It is assumed that the arrest is not a mere pretext for the search.
165. See Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (1970); cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
166. Cf. the application of California Government Code section 26640 following
an unlawful arrest.
167. 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339 P.2d 156 (1959) (discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 97-98 supra).
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highly questionable, that relationship may have been abandoned. Al-
though the court did not discuss the theory of deterrence, it did indi-
cate that the officers were empowered to tow and inventory a vacant car
regardless of the cause of the occupants' absence. 68
If the exclusionary rule is regarded merely as an instrument of po-
lice reform, the Simpson approach can be taken as correct. To the au-
thor, that is a strong signal that the rule is something more. At this
point, however, the principles under review, though quite literally ele-
mentary, begin to resist formulation in a manner simultaneously conso-
nant with all the accepted leading cases. To begin with, the opinion in
Terry v. Ohio,'69 which has important elements in common with Moz-
zetti, hardly seems the product of the same society as Mapp v. Ohio.'7
The Terry court flatly rejects "judicial integrity" as an independent rea-
son for excluding evidence. 71  In Mapp the Court had, however, re-
ferred to judicial integrity as an "imperative" based on that most pro-
found of policy considerations, preservation of the state: "Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than . . . its disregard of the
charter of its own existence."'1 72  For Terry, Chief Justice Warren took
a more Wolfish173 position, apparently regarding exclusion of uncon-
stitutionally procured evidence purely in terms of deterrence vel non.
Strictly speaking, Chief Justice Warren's remarks rejecting the "ju-
dicial integrity" argument in Terry are dicta, since he ultimately decided
that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment at all. Never-
theless, he takes pains to indicate that the exclusionary rule would be
inappropriate for evidence turned up in the standard police pat-down,
a proposition which would be irrelevant unless applicable to case's in
which the bounds of the Fourth Amendment are transgressed. 7 4  One
168. Id. at 530, 339 P.2d at 159-60, citing People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248,
305 P.2d 145 (1956) (discussed in text accompanying notes 89-90 and 100-01 supra).
169. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
170. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
171. 392 U.S. at 12-13. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the
court rejected the "silver platter" doctrine partly on the theory that faithfulness to
the constitution precluded affirming a judgment which could not have been obtained
without violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker, Harlan
and Clark dissented. Mr. Justice Clark, however, wrote the opinion in Mapp, from
which Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker and Harlan dissented, and cited Elkins for the
importance of judicial integrity. But see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955), where integrity seems to be conceived as no more than a refusal to lend
a hand to police misconduct.
172. 367 U.S. at 659.
173. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
174. The circumstances delineated in Terry are such that little expectation of
privacy could reasonably have been maintained. "We merely hold today that where a
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is left with the impression that the high court's Fourth Amendment jur-
isprudence as expressed in Terry and Wolf has a place for evidence
which, though seized in violation of constitutional rights, is admissible
because the police conduct involved would not be deterred by exclusion.
Although the Terry dicta may be no more than an eddy in the
mainstream of search and seizure law so far as the classic illegal search
is concerned, they retain dangerous potential in the area of governmen-
tal "looking and taking note" during the course of benevolent invasions.
Some light is shed on possible means of resolving the problem by a case
cited by the respondent in Mozzetti and properly given rather short
shrift by the court in the context in which it was advanced.
Until rendition of the opinion in Wyman v. James' (and despite
the implications of Katz), most discussion of the Mapp rule assumed
that in order for evidence to be excluded, the process of obtaining it
would have to be illegal in the sense of being enjoinable. In Wyman a
welfare mother sought to halt the practice of the "periodic home visit"
(PHV) by a member of the social service department. The purpose of
the PHV was, inter alia, to ascertain whether the recipient had lied on
her eligibility application or was otherwise criminally defrauding the
government; the method was for a social worker to enter the home, ob-
serve the conditions, and report any evidence of violation. No probable
cause to believe fraud had been committed was necessary to authorize
a PHV, and no warrant was sought. Entry was enforced by suspen-
sion of benefits on refusal.
A three-judge trial court entered judgment for plaintiff, declaring
that the New York statutes and implementing regulations authorizing
the PHV were void, and enjoining the state from terminating Mrs.
James's assistance as a penalty for refusing entry. 1 7  The Supreme
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or otheis' safety, he is entitled for the protection of him-
self and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him." 392 U.S. at 30-31. Now that it is abundantly clear that stop-and-frisk in
actual practice extends to a far greater range of police-citizen encounters. See, e.g.,
People v. Aviles, 21 Cal. App. 3d 230, 98 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1971). The question
whether unconstitutionally seized evidence is admissible where exclusion would not
deter police misconduct is a live one.
175. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
176. The plaintiff had always been willing to provide requested information at the
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Court reversed, holding that the PHV "violates no right guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment.' 1 77  That the majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Blackmun proceeds from a conception of the welfare system which bor-
ders on the functionally illiterate to a conclusion reminiscent of the most
simplistic inventory cases is less important than the fact that the court
expressly reserved the question whether the fruits of the social worker's
search would be admissible in a criminal prosecution. 178
Although its origin may be in nothing more august than a cloak-
room compromise necessary to obtain a majority, the statement in Wy-
man that the admissibility of evidence is an open question even though
no illegal act led to its discovery is of profound importance, and sug-
gests a possible means of preserving the citizen's sphere of privacy while
recognizing the legitimacy of a number of benevolent-but-intrusive gov-
ernmental practices: Let the officer open the trunk to safeguard valu-
ables, but do not admit anything that turns up into evidence.
social service office, so only the "verification," not the fact-gathering, function of the
PHV was at stake. Id. at 313-14.
177. Id. at 326.
178. See id. at 323. Only Justices White, Douglas and Marshall thought the
PHV was necessarily a search. The majority opinion, however, falls into a pattern
familiar to readers of inventory cases: The PRV is not a search; "[i]f however, we
were to assume that a caseworker's home visit, before or subsequent to the bene-
ficiary's initial qualification for benefits, somehow (perhaps because the average
beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse consent to the visit), and
despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the
traditional sense . . ." it is reasonable. Id. at 318. The real belief of the opinion
writer may be revealed in the unguarded phrasing of another passage: "If consent to
the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or
merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no
search." Id. at 317-18.
The arguments which the Court found so persuasive as to "compel [the con-
clusion) that the home visit proposed for Mrs. James is not unreasonable," id. at
318, may be summarized thusly, following roughly the court's enumeration: 1. The
infant for whose benefit the search is being conducted, is unable to give his consent to
the search; therefore, no consent should be required. 2. There is a paramount state
interest in fulfillment of a "public trust," which is sufficient to overcome counter-
vailing interests so long as the search is by "gentle means." 3. The donor is naturally
curious as to how his charitable gifts are being used; where the donor is the state,
such inquisitiveness is especially legitimate. 4. The welfare system is benign. 5. The
search is conducted with politeness, extending even to advance notice. 6. The appellee
is complaining only of the fact that it is her home being entered, and not of the conduct
of the worker were it engaged in somewhere else. 7. The search is a good way to find
out whether the recipient has been lying. 8. The worker does not wear a uniform,
and is a "friend in need" rather than a policeman making a general search. 9. The
search is not in aid of any [pending? RCH] criminal proceedings. 10. There being no
probable cause for the search, the worker could not obtain a warrant; even if a warrant
could be obtained, it would not be of any value to appellee, since it would be pro-
cured ex parte, and would necessarily empower the welfare worker to break down the
door.
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Perhaps the real deficiency of the Terry-Wolf approach is that it
focuses too narrowly on the hand in the pocket. Granted, abuse of the
power to search is felt most immediately in the physical intrusion by the
police officer. But if what is being protected is the right of the indi-
vidual to a reasonably dimensioned sphere of privacy, violence to the
amendment does not stop with the intruding hand or ear.179  The act
of placing before the trier of fact an item of physical evidence obtained
by invading that sector of the citizen's life he reasonably thought free
of the governmental presence at least equally violates the protected in-
terest. To consider it something to be avoided merely because it en-
courages the constable to violate the constitution is to replace integrity
with snobbery. Disrespect for the Fourth Amendment is not exclu-
sively a sin of the "lower classes" of the legal system.
It may be objected that the ends of the judicial system will be
thwarted if a policeman who has done nothing bad is nevertheless pre-
cluded from using evidence he holds in his hands. That, however, is
to say only that Fourth Amendment protection of privacy prevents suc-
cessful prosecution of some detected crimes. There seems no reason
whatever to believe that the carrying on of beneficial activities would
be deterred. We do not even know whether exclusion discourages po-
lice misconduct.18 0  That datum is, however, not essential for arriving
at the conclusion that fulfilling constitutional guarantees in the court-
room is desirable both as minimally honorable conduct and as a pre-
requisite to maintenance of that public respect which in free societies is
necessary for the continued existence of the state. If admission would
thwart the citizen's reasonable efforts to live a life which is in certain
179. Indeed, the defendant in Katz suffered no perceptible harm from the eaves-
dropping until the court system began to act upon the evidence. Justice Cardozo's
famous objection as a New York judge to the exclusionary rule, that the criminal goes
free because the constable has blundered, People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926), is insufficient because it shifts attention away from the agency
which ultimately decides the issue of freedom. The judicial pursuit of truth, sup-
posedly advanced by reception of all relevant evidence not excluded by some extrinsic
policy, is quite different from the scientific quest for knowledge. Since the quest of
the courts has no purpose but to secure a legitimate judgment-i.e., one consistent with
the controlling precepts of the legal system-judges should recognize an intrinsic policy
preventing judgments which themselves disappoint constitutionally fostered expecta-
tions. Scientific truth is, of course, often desirable, but to strive for a desirable end
by doing violence to every great principle which stands in its way is no service to
public justice. Sometimes a lawman's search is freed of constitutional scrutiny by
the mere participation of civilian searchers. See People v. Morton, 21 Cal. App. 3d
772, 98 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1971).
180. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
Cin. L. REV. 665, 709 (1970).
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respects private, the evidence should be rejected, regardless of how it
was come by.181 The police can then inventory cars for the greater
safety of private property, free of whatever conflicting feelings they may
have about sacrificing Fourth Amendment interests.
181. Most courts would declare themselves freed from the duty of considering the
Fourth Amendment implications if only the garageman would take his own inventory,
since violations of reasonable expectations of privacy by persons other than law en-
forcement officers are commonly considered outside the Mapp rule. See, e.g., People v.
Posada, 198 Cal. App. 2d 535, 539, 17 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1961); cf. Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 708-09, 484 P.2d 84, 90, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (1971).

